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To many people in the world, the tragic death of Diana, Princess
of Wales, on August 31, 1997, caused a world-wide shock. Evaluating
the accident and especially the reports in the media about it, we can
conclude that the event put comparative law in the center of legal
interest. Even on the television network CNN, French legal experts
and specialists in comparative law were interviewed. For lawyers
with a common law background, this drew attention to the type of
investigation conducted by investigative magistrates. Familiar with
an adversarial system of investigation, common law lawyers are not
accustomed to the figure of a judge who, in a neutral position,
investigates a case such as this accident and the complexity of its
causes. Nevertheless, an investigative judge is the hallmark of
procedural quality in many Continental countries. I will not expand
on this here, since there is a vast literature on the subject.
The tragic accident, moreover, can awaken American or Dutch
prejudice or bias toward the acceptance of alcohol in French social
life, especially with regard to drivers' consumption of alcoholic
beverages prior to driving. Apart from such bias, one can at least
question the relation between legal norms and practical enforcement
of those norms in countries such as France or, with regard to other
laws, The Netherlands.'
On a more general level, and apart from comparative law and
the French Republic, the first results of the police investigation in
Paris, as they were released by the public prosecutor, are very
interesting. Without decades of forensic technical opportunities, and
forensic expertise, the investigation probably would have
concentrated exclusively on the behavior of the paparazzi. The
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Rijks Universiteit Leiden (Leiden University);
Director, International Network for Research on the Law of Evidence and
Procedure/Seminarium voor bewijsrecht; Judge, the Court of Appeals of Amsterdam
1. The Netherlands is also known as a country where regulation and practice often
are contrasted; one example is the manner in which the drug legislation is enforced. The
best explanation a person from the Netherlands can give a person from France is as
follows: "we do with soft drugs what you do with alcohol and traffic after lunch-it is
being lenient."
objective data concerning the blood alcohol level of the driver,
however, drew attention to other circumstances relevant to criminal
law. Forensic expertise in the field of blood or breath testing has
provided us with ever better and more accurate tests throughout the
years. In order to avoid evidentiary problems with subjective legal
standards about taking risks in driving, most legislatures have chosen
the formal, technical definition of permissible and impermissible
quantities of alcohol in the blood or breath. The increasing number
of experts and forms of expertise have shaped and are thoroughly
shaping the legal landscape in criminal law. In the epilogue of
Evidence Law Adrift,' Mirjan Damagka pays attention to the
Copernican revolution in the criminal justice system, caused by the
overall appearance of expertise and experts of known legal
disciplines.' This is his book's second plot.
I will now more systematically discuss aspects of the most recent
book of Professor Damagka, and in so doing I will focus primarily on
his first plot. But before I do this, I would like to express my
gratitude to the Evidence professors of Hastings College of the Law,
who invested so much effort in bringing me here this Fall trimester
on a staff exchange program with Leiden University. Apart from
this, I am honored to be a participant in this panel, since we discuss
here the most recent intellectual product of one of the most
significant comparativists of this time.
Like Professor Damagka, I have a Continental background. I
received my legal education from the law faculty of the Free
University in Amsterdam and since then I have taught Criminal Law,
Criminal Procedure, Evidence, and Comparative Law at Leiden
University. In particular, my research in the field of comparative law
has brought me all over the world, and I have become accustomed to
common law legal systems, thought, and practice. Apart from my
scholarly work, I have been active as a judge in the Court of Appeals
of Amsterdam for close to a decade. The Court of Appeals in a
Continental system is usually a trial court. So it is in my case. The
Court of Appeals of Amsterdam tries criminal cases de novo. Thus, I
try to combine theory and practice. My criminal law orientation may
be recognizable in my remarks about evidence law, although most of
what I have to say is not limited solely to criminal procedure.
1. Outline of Dama~ka's Book
During the preparation of these comments, I learned that
2. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA. EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997).
3. Id. at 142-52.
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Gordon Van Kessel prepared a summary4 of Evidence Law Adrift.
Therefore, I can be very brief here. According to Dama~ka, typical
Anglo-American evidence law, especially its American variant, can
be perceived as the product of three somewhat inter-dependent
factors, or pillars, that shape the context in which this part of the law
can exist and survive. The first is the split in functions of judge and
jury (or variations thereof). The second is the concentrated oral trial
as it traditionally exists in common law countries. The third is the
adversary system--the party-driven process. In the book, all three
elements or factors (or pillars on which the "system" of the rules of
evidence rests) are discussed in separate chapters. These chapters
are full of comparative elements, especially comparisons with
Continental systems. At the heart of Dama~ka's analysis, he states
that the so-called bifurcated trial (the system with the split tasks of
judge and jury) and the concentrated trial are disappearing in the
sense that they often are replaced by other forms, leaving the
adversary system as the only factor that still contributes to the
permanence of typical Anglo-American evidence law. These changes
are highlighted and discussed in the account of institutional
transformation, in chapter five of the book. In his epilogue, as I have
stated above concerning his second plot, Dama~ka gives attention to
the impact of the increasing involvement of non-legal experts in
steadily more different applied forensic forms of expertise in the legal
process.
Dama~ka's comparative remarks show that his scholarly
enterprise-the comparison of Continental and Anglo-American
forms of procedure-has become mature. His account of similarities
('look alikes') and differences between national and legal systems
and cultures is nuanced. He gives many examples, and the footnotes
that accompany his remarks show an extraordinary quantity and
quality of reading.
H. Vision, Abstraction
It is difficult to disagree with many of the general views
advocated by Dama~ka. His examples are remarkably well
documented and the analysis shows both experience and vision.
Where vision is important, I do not think it makes much sense to
criticize small details of arguments and examples. Related to the
criminal procedure law of Continental countries, such a mini-
discussion occurs when Damagka observes that the standard of
4. See Gordon Van Kessel, A Summary of Mirjan R. Damagka's Evidence Law
Adrift, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 356 (1998). Professor Van Kessel is a Professor of Law at the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law, and a former visiting professor at
Leiden University, The Netherlands.
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intimate conviction (conviction intime) has recently been replaced by
a standard of explicable conviction (conviction raisonnde).5 Here, he
seems to neglect the fact that by the end of the 19th Century in The
Netherlands, a distinction was drawn between the conviction intime
and the conviction raisonnde, and that already for more than a
century it has been required that decisions be accompanied by inter-
subjective, compelling arguments.6 Moreover, as we will see,7 giving
reasons for factual findings is not unique to Continental systems.
The book is a coherent, consistent, and well-written piece of
work. It combines description with analysis and evaluation, and from
time to time does not avoid opinion. Dama~ka treats the systems,
with respect for national differences, as a whole. This leads to a sort
of abstraction which has strong sides and weak sides. The strong
sides are related to the helicopter view, in which a whole system can
be characterized and compared. This is without doubt a very
powerful form of comparison. The weaker sides have their origins in
exactly the same abstraction: what, exactly, is the system of law
described? And are there not many more factors, interrelated with
the three pillars mentioned above, that contribute to the existence
and permanence of Anglo-American evidence law? Here, I will
make some critical remarks about Dama~ka's book. The core point
of my remarks is this: I do not believe that evidence law in common
law countries has been watered down to such an extent in recent
years. Further, I expect that it will stay in its place in the years ahead.
The book I would like to compare to Dama~ka's is Umberto Eco's
Foucault's Pendulum,' where all the details are true, but the plot is
fiction. Similarly, Damagka's plot, that evidence law is adrift, is
fiction. But Damaka-in contrast to Eco-has a second plot: the
impact of forensic expertise in legal processes.9 In my opinion, this
second plot is not fiction.
I1. Remarks
Here, at first, it might be important to trace back the origins of
Damagka's analytical model presented in his [986 book, The Faces of
5. DAMASKA, supra note 2, at 40.
6. Damagka mentions the giving of reasons in relation to the tasks of appellate
courts. Although in earlier days the "checking" rationale often was felt as the most
important, the "explanation" rationale was not unknown. See, e.g., David Simons,
Motiveering van strafvonnissen, XI TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR STRAFRECHT 321-54 (1898):
Bernardus Maria Taverne, Motiveering van strafvonnissen. XXXVII TIJDSCHRIFr VOOR
STRAFRECHT 210-63 (1928).
7. See id. concerning South Africa.
8. UMBERTO ECO, FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM (William Weaver trans., Ballantine
Books 1990).
9. DAMASKA, supra note 2, at 147.
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Justice and State Authority. In the 1970s, Damagka was involved in a
discussion about the meaning and realism of experimental studies of
the performance of lay decision makers. In his well known 1973
article in The University of Pennsylvania Law Review," Damagka
asked why the evidentiary barriers to conviction appeared to be so
much higher in common law jurisdictions than in civil law
jurisdictions. In this context, Dama~ka, without labeling it that way,
already drew attention to the difference between atomistic and
holistic approaches to evidence. From this point, Dama~ka's
sophistication in analyzing the differences between Continental and
common law systems begins to fly higher and higher. Reading his
most recent book," I noted that he seems very much oriented to legal
texts, especially authoritative texts like codes and statutes, but also
case law and scholarly writings. In a certain way, Dama~ka as a
comparativist goes "native": he does not explicitly distance himself
from the internal views of the legal discipline. And insofar as he
sometimes does go further, political science seems to be nearly the
only social science that seriously forms part of his intellectual
exercise.
One of the failures of legal scholarship and legal education is an
apparent preference for describing and analyzing the complex and
the unique, rather than the average, and for paying more attention to
exceptions and exceptions to exceptions, instead of the main rules,
especially the rules that apply to standard practice. In fact, the
regularities of the law in action are often neglected or overlooked. In
most legal systems, or maybe it is better to say here legal cultures,
there are considerable differences between theory and practice. In
the example I began with-the death of Diana, Princess of Wales-I
already pointed to the possible difference between the legal
regulations for driving under influence of alcohol and its practical
enforcement by the criminal justice system. Another example may
be the exceptional character of full formal processes and full formal
trials in average cases in modem Western countries, like The
Netherlands. Out of all criminal cases in Holland involving serious
offenses, about 70% are dealt with along different routes than the full
trial process. Many cases end with a transaction without getting to a
judge; another large segment is dealt with by a judge sitting alone
instead of a panel of judges. 2 This, as such, is not new at all. The
same kind of observation can be made about the American criminal
10. Mijan R. Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973).
11. Not all Damagka's writings are as "legal" as Evidence Law Adrift.
12. The Dutch Court of Criminal Procedure provides in this form of process, but one
can infer from the system that it was meant as an exception, not as the rule, for the
majority of cases.
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justice system. Although the decision-making body seems to be the
jury, in fact only a small minority of cases are dealt with by a jury.
Settling the facts in the form of plea bargaining is often the best
option for all participants involved to end the case. The defendant
avoids a high penalty, and the prosecutor avoids high investments in
time and money in the concrete process. 13 The small number of cases
tried before a jury is not such a new phenomenon in common law
jurisdictions. In my opinion, it would be worth not simply stating that
indeed the importance of the jury is on the retreat, as Damagka does,
but also analyzing further the question of whether or not we are
confronted with a further decrease; an in-depth analysis of what
exactly differs here between practice and theory. Therefore, I ask for
both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the transformation-or
the supposed transformation-that is taking place with regard to the
function of the jury in Anglo-American systems. A related theme of
research is the impact of the law of evidence in the "negotiations"
between parties before trial, intended to avoid trial. 4 Ironically
enough, this theme is closely related to the adversarial system. It
seems that one impact or effect of the third factor upholding the law
of evidence, the adversary system, is that in practice the first and
second lose-or more precisely, have lost-much of their importance.
Only from a monodisciplinary legal perspective might this be
perceived as a paradox.
With regard to the loss of the concentrated trial, I think that
both in relation to common law and to Continental law systems, we
should be aware of the emergence of many forms of alternative
procedures, that are indeed abbreviated in their fact-finding function,
but which can be depicted as very concentrated trials or procedures.
Only complicated and high-profile cases challenge the possibilities of
the system, including the evidence rules, to the utmost; the
requirement that the trial should by preference be oral and
concentrated is not a unique legal requirement in common law
systems. Continental countries like Germany, France, and The
Netherlands also have provisions in their Codes of Criminal
13. There are other forms of "alternative adjudication" as well. See DAMASKA.
supra note 2, at 58-73, 125-42.
14. A small excursion: as I already mentioned, the conviction raisonne is a standard
of proof that includes giving of reasons for factual findings. A recent experience of legal
tourism has been the "discovery" of South Africa. South Africa is a common law country,
at least at the procedural side of the law. Criminal cases are dealt with by courts
consisting of a magistrate or a judge eventually sitting together with assessors (sometimes
lay assessors). I was surprised by the custom to motivate factual findings very
extensively. Many court sessions I attended, which were conducted in Afrikaans, a
language closely related to Dutch, resembled typical Dutch elements in the common law
system.
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Procedure that require making the process as compact as possible.
Here again, practice frequently overtakes the written law. But is that
not equally true in common law countries?
One of the most forceful aspects of Dama~ka's book is his
analysis of the adversarial system. On other occasions, following
Malcolm Feeley's views,15 I have written about the American
adversarial system, perceived as not only a legal system, but also as a
social system, deeply rooted in the specific socio-economic and
political ideological aspects of the American society. In a recently
published article on the adversarial system in the special issue of the
Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law about culture
and proof,16 I explicitly referred to the commercial and competitive
character of the social and economic conditions in the American
society.
I referred above to the fact that Dama~ka as a comparativist
finds his sources for his comparative analysis primarily in legal and
comparative texts, and that although he delivers a kind of meta-
theory on the law, his sources often seem to be limited to the
perspectives of lawyers describing the law. That means that in a
certain way, the texts that Dama~ka uses and, indirectly his own text,
"reflect ideals rather than the real." That is to say, the analysis often
assumes that things in daily procedural reality occur as prescribed.
When we come back to the three factors in his analysis, we might find
that both the bifurcated decision body and the concentrated trial are
legal conceptions with respect to which the legal rule does not
directly reflect daily practice. It is only the full formal process where
they come aboard. Again, this is not new. And this might be the
difference between the first two pillars or factors in Dama~ka's
analysis and the third pillar. The adversarial system seems to be
much more real than the first and second, in terms of not only a legal
system, but also a social system, and that might explain why there is a
good foundation for the thesis that the adversarial system will stay
firmly in its place in the years ahead. It is the system of "partisan"
conduct in the trial, but especially of "partisan" preparation and
avoidance of the trial (which John Griffiths17 once labeled the 'battle-
model'). It might be worth further analyzing the adversarial system
as a social system from the perspective of professionalism and the
15. See Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCESSES OF LAW 753, 753-66 (Robert J. Janosik ed., 1987).
16. J.F. Nijboer, The American Adversarial System in Criminal Cases: Between
Ideology and Reality, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 79, 96 (1997).
17. See John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third "Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 367-71 (1970); John Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal
Law Scholarship, 79 YALE L. 1388 (1970).
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increasing impact of technique and science on society.
Professionalism in the legal practice within the market economy of
the United States might be related to professionalism in other
societal regions, such as the applied sciences. And here the circle is
completed by the subject matter of the sixth chapter of Damagka's
book: the era of the expert.
When we look at the current development of the human rights
case law in Europe, we see a move towards more adversariality
within the minimum standards for a fair process, such as that
intended by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The impetus comes from the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.
together with the increasing professionalism in the legal domain in
Europe, where the profession of legal counselors and advocates (the
Bar) is growing in impact and number. Negotiations between
prosecution and defense are becoming a more usual phenomenon in
Europe, as in the United States. The single-market Europe
stimulates the market economy, which fosters the adversary system,
just as in the United States! It is the market of freely competing
professional lawyers and of creativity in finding new (commercial)
forms of applied forensic expertise.
IV. The Need for Detailed Studies
If we take comparative law as a serious and enlightening
enterprise, it is of course undeniable that the highly abstract and
sophisticated kinds of analysis engaged in by Damagka are major
landmarks for orientation. But, when we analyze legal systems from
a comparative point of view, we should not restrict ourselves to the
"upper" levels of the law, the black letter law, the case law of
Supreme Courts, and official guidelines, et cetera. We should also
look to daily practice and routines. I would advocate a series of
comparative studies that combine quantitative data about the
criminal justice system, such as the kind of profile studies published
by the HEUNI Institute in Helsinki. Apart from that, I would like to
see more detailed qualitative studies at the case level, especially in
the domain of evidence. It is very important to see how the actual
actors in different systems handle evidential aspects of investigation
and proof. In theory, one might expect that especially in Western
countries, one would find many similarities across the borders.
Truth, as well as means and techniques of investigation, are not that
different throughout the Western world. But it might very well be
that unarticulated local factors and cultural elements change the
picture in an unpredictable way.
As a metaphor, consider the work of a task force of the
European Railway Societies. They tried to develop a driver's cabin
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49
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for a train that would be usable throughout Europe. They
accomplished a major task, since they finally succeeded in developing
such a cabin, but the approach they were forced to follow was very
difficult. It appeared that very few functional differences existed-
for instance, the various electric currents used in the different
countries-but the enormous differences in the design of train cabins
in different countries seemed mainly to result from non-explicit
cultural assumptions about human behavior, which are different
everywhere."
18. The difficult to articulate "collective mental program" is the mode of thought
shared by the members of the same society or group of (sub-)culture.
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